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Issues Facing the International Criminal
Court's Preparatory Commission
Richard Dicker*
The conclusion of the Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court
(ICC) was a historic achievement. The ICC has the potential to curtail the
sense of impunity all too often associated with genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. With widespread ratifications, the ICC can
help create a culture of accountability. Over a period of time, and not without problems in the initial phases, the ICC will provide victims with justice,
strengthen national courts, and deter the commission of these crimes. The
ICC Treaty creates a viable, independent, and effective international forum
functioning according to the highest standards of international justice.
The ICC Statute codifies the balance between divergent political interests
and legal traditions. It is a complex document, negotiated by officials representing scores of States and contains many compromises. For example,
its provisions give the ICC less authority than the Human Rights Watch
organization, among others, considers necessary and desirable.' However,
despite these compromises, the ICC can hold the individuals accused of
these crimes to account. Nevertheless, even the ICC's most ardent supporters realize the ICC will not be a panacea for the world's violations of international humanitarian law. There is much work to be done and serious
challenges lie ahead before the Court becomes a reality.
There was an overwhelming support at the end of the Diplomatic Conference in Rome for these objectives: 120 States voted in favor of the
Treaty, seven voted against. A powerful coalition of States north and south
engineered the Treaty, including Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia,
Germany, the Netherlands, South Africa, the Republic of Korea, and Senegal. The cooperation suggests optimism regarding the future success of the
ICC. Unfortunately, the U.S. government, along with a few others including China, Iraq, and Libya, voted against the Statute.
The first session of the Preparatory Commission for the ICC
(PrepCom), which met in February 1999, was successful. Under Chairman Philippe Kirsch's leadership, delegates plunged into their substantive
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tasks. In addition to drafting the ICC's Elements of Crimes, 2 the PrepCom
was mandated to draft Rules of Evidence and Procedure for the ICC. 3 The
PrepCom established a Working Group on Rules of Evidence and
Procedure.
This Working Group has critical tasks before it. The elaboration of
principled and practical rules is critical to the functioning of the ICC. The
Rules must ensure that the ICC can function effectively while guaranteeing
unequivocal respect for the rights of suspects. The Rules must protect the
interests of witnesses who may put themselves at risk as a result of giving
evidence, especially since the ICC may ultimately depend on their testimony in prosecuting the accused. The Rules must balance clarity and pre4
cision with flexibility.
Specifically, there are three issues that the PrepCom must address in
formulating the Rules of Evidence and Procedure. First, the length of pretrial detention. Second, the standard for disclosure. Third, the protection
of witness interests and disclosure.
I.

Pre-Trial Detention

Article 60(4) of the ICC Statute states that "[t]he pre-trial chamber shall
ensure that a person is nof detained for an unreasonable period of time
prior to trial due to inexcusable delay by the prosecutor."5 When this text
went to the drafting committee on June 24, 1998, it was accompanied by a
footnote stating that the time frame should be addressed in the Rules of
Evidence and Procedure. Any such detention should be as short as possible and never exceed a reasonable period of time. While what constitutes a
reasonable period will vary depending on the nature of the particular case,
pre-trial detention should be limited to a specified maximum period. 6
Nevertheless, in recognition of the complexity of the crimes likely to
be under investigation and the need for a degree of flexibility, the Rules
should allow for the possibility of extending the period in exceptional circumstances where the interests of justice so require. No such extension
should be granted where the need for it is "due to inexcusable delay by the
Prosecutor."'7 The accused should be entitled to challenge, before the PreTrial Chamber, any decision to extend the period of detention, irrespective
of whether the accused has already challenged the lawfulness of the detention per se. Furthermore, the rules should explicitly state that the accused
2. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
3. See id.
4. See Non-Governmental OrganizationAction Alert (No.3) Feb. 1998 <http://www.
hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/cc/act-alrt.htm,.
5. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 60, para. 4.
6. See Justice in the Balance - Recommendations for an Independent and Effective
InternationalCriminal Court Pre-TrialArrest and Detention (last visited Sept. 21, 1999)
<http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports98/icc/itbwb-11.htm#P1547_260623>.
7. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 60(4).
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has the right to be released if he or she is not charged in accordance with
the time frame and procedure established in the Statute.
II. The Standard for Disclosure
The rules of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, consistent
with the ICC Statute, suggest that the Rules should instruct the prosecutor
to disclose the "existence of evidence known to the Prosecutor which in
any way tends to suggest the innocence or might mitigate the guilt of8 the
accused or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence."
Disclosure is essential to ensure that the defendant has access to all
information that may be relevant to the preparation of his or her defense.
Similarly, disclosure will enable the ICC to have all the materials relevant
to its determination of the suspect's guilt or innocence. Therefore, the disclosure requirement should be broad. However, legitimate concerns about
the disclosure of information being seriously detrimental to ongoing investigations or to the interests or victims or witnesses, should be addressed
through specific rules designed to protect certain categories of
information. 9
III. The Protection of Witness Interests and Disclosure
The prosecutor should have due regard to the protection of the interests of
victims and witnesses in making any determination as to disclosure. Consistent with the rights of the accused, measures should be taken not to
disclose information, or to delay disclosure, where victims' or witnesses'
interests would be adversely affected. The prosecutor should consult with
the Victim and Witness Protection Unit if he or she considers that disclosure may raise issues of specific concern to the interests of victims and
witnesses.
IV. The ICC's Jurisdictional Regime
While the PrepCom session went reasonably well in both substance and
tone, the positive sense of progress may signal the calm before the storm.
The whole undertaking may be at serious risk if the U.S. government
attempts, by itself or perhaps working with a surrogate, to re-open negotiations concluded at the Diplomatic Conference. During the February session of the PrepCom there were numerous reliable reports that delegates
were being canvassed by the U.S. Delegation for their reactions to a possible protocol amending Article 12 of the Rome Statute.
Article 12 was the focus of the most difficult negotiations at the Diplomatic Conference. 10 The U.S. government has objected to Article 12. Article 12 contains the core of the ICC's jurisdictional regime. According to
8. Rules of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, IT/Rev.14.
9. See Justice in the Balance - Recommendations for an Independent and Effective
International Criminal Court, The Protection of National Security (last visited Sept. 21,
1999) <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports98/icc/jitbwb-1l.htm#P195L329240>.
10. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 11.
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this provision, in cases other than those referred by the Security Council,
the ICC will be able to act where the state on whose territory the crimes
were committed or the state of nationality of the accused have ratified the
Treaty or accepted the ICC's jurisdiction over the crime."
This jurisdictional structure is based on two principles: 1) the principle of territoriality where a State exercises jurisdiction over an offender
because the offense was committed on the territory of that State and 2) the
principle of active nationality where a State exercises jurisdiction over an
offender on the ground that the offender is a national of the State concerned. Thus, Article 12 is rooted in two longstanding jurisdictional principles of international law. Given the alternative bases of jurisdiction
codified in Article 12, it is indeed possible that the citizen of a State that is
not a party to the Treaty could, in situations where the other multiple safeguards of complementarity are satisfied, be tried by the ICC. There is,
however, nothing unusual about the conferral of jurisdiction over nationals
of non-state parties through the mechanism of treaty law. There are many
12
international conventions that grant such competence to national courts.

The United States is a party to these treaties. In fact, U.S. District Courts
have exercised jurisdiction over nationals of non state parties to various
treaties in a number of cases on the basis of the treaty provisions empowering the courts to do so. One example involved a Lebanese citizen suspected of hijacking a Jordanian aircraft in the Middle East. Based on
domestic legislation implementing the International Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the United States exercised jurisdiction as the state
13
of nationality of two U.S. citizens who were the victims of these crimes.
The U.S. government has criticized the Rome Treaty and the ICC
because the ICC's jurisdiction over the national of a non- state party contravenes international law. At the Rome Conference the U.S. Delegation
threatened to actively oppose the ICC if it had this authority. In Rome, the
U.S. Delegation sought an ironclad guarantee that no U.S. citizen could
ever be investigated or tried by the ICC without the consent of the United
States. The other delegations decisively rejected this approach. Now, the
U.S. government appears to be pursuing by other means what it could not
obtain through the negotiations in Rome. One proposal the United States
suggested at the February PrepCom meeting would create two separate
jurisdictional regimes: one for crimes committed in international situations and another for crimes committed in internal situations. This suggestion would codify a bifurcated regime that requires different
jurisdictional standards for internal and external crimes. The U.S. Delegation arranged many bilateral meetings to discuss this option. However,
before a final decision is made, one must consider several drawbacks to the
U.S. proposal.
11. See id.
12. See, e.g., United Nations General Assembly: Convention on the Safety of United

Nations and Associated Personnel, 34 I.L.M. 482 (1995).
13. See U.S. v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C.Cir. 1991).
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As a matter of principle, no state ought to be able to write an exemption for its citizens under this Treaty. Any measures guaranteeing that a
U.S. citizen or any other national could not be investigated or prosecuted
by the ICC would undermine its authority. Such exemption cannot be justified by any conception of international law or international criminal
responsibility. Furthermore, since the ICC's Statute must be applied
equally to all individuals, whether they are serving the most powerful or
the least powerful state, any exemption for a U.S. citizen would have to
apply to all.
The U.S. proposal is problematic for practical reasons as well. The
Rome Treaty was negotiated by delegates representing scores of States. The
Treaty contains many compromises. No State achieved everything it
wanted and many were disappointed with several provisions. If one State
or group of States initiates an effort to change the text overwhelmingly
approved in Rome, it will trigger a process that would be impossible to
manage. Amending one provision risks unraveling the whole Treaty.
Moreover, this would create an undermining precedent for future multilateral negotiations.
There are additional reasons why this type of amendment is dangerous. Doubts about the final substantive content of the Treaty could chill
signature, ratification, and entry into force. States might delay complicated ratification procedures if the final content of the instrument
remained in doubt. An effort to re-open the ICC Statute could lead to a
significant delay in ratification and entry into force. This would prevent
the ICC from prosecuting impunity regimes.
Finally, there are domestic political reasons particular to the United
States that make re-opening these negotiations an ill-conceived effort.
Despite the desire of States to accommodate reasonable U.S. concerns, this
effort will fail. The failure will engender bitterness and resentment. This
will inflame the ill-informed opposition to the ICC. Ultimately, a failure to
reach a compromise could strengthen the already powerful unilateralist
trends within the United States. For all these reasons, U.S. policy makers
should avoid any amendment and adopt a reasonable negotiated stance.
V. Constructive Engagement
There is another possible approach. The ICC will be a means to establish a
culture of accountability. It will also advance U.S. policy objectives concerning human rights. Rather than jeopardizing the ICC or actively opposing it, the United States should pursue a policy of constructive
engagement. The U.S. Delegation has a contribution to make to the Rules
of Evidence and Procedure and the Elements of Crimes in the Rome Statute. The United States can, without signing or ratifying, influence the
ICC's functioning. Once the ICC is established, the U.S. government can
fashion its policy based on the ICC's actual practice. U.S. policy makers
would long regret any attempt to undermine a priori the most important
humanitarian law enforcement institution created in decades.

